‘An act of insanity and national humiliation’: the Ford Administration, Congressional inquiries and the ban on assassination by Luca, Trenta
 Cronfa -  Swansea University Open Access Repository
   
_____________________________________________________________
   
This is an author produced version of a paper published in:
Journal of Intelligence History
                                      
   
Cronfa URL for this paper:
http://cronfa.swan.ac.uk/Record/cronfa38323
_____________________________________________________________
 
Paper:
Trenta, L. (2018).  ‘An act of insanity and national humiliation’: the Ford Administration, Congressional inquiries and
the ban on assassination. Journal of Intelligence History, 1-20.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/16161262.2018.1430431
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
_____________________________________________________________
  
This item is brought to you by Swansea University. Any person downloading material is agreeing to abide by the terms
of the repository licence. Copies of full text items may be used or reproduced in any format or medium, without prior
permission for personal research or study, educational or non-commercial purposes only. The copyright for any work
remains with the original author unless otherwise specified. The full-text must not be sold in any format or medium
without the formal permission of the copyright holder.
 
Permission for multiple reproductions should be obtained from the original author.
 
Authors are personally responsible for adhering to copyright and publisher restrictions when uploading content to the
repository.
 
http://www.swansea.ac.uk/library/researchsupport/ris-support/ 
 1	  
	  
‘An act of insanity and national humiliation’: the Ford Administration, Congressional inquiries 
and the ban on assassination. 
 
Abstract: The US government’s increasing reliance on targeted killings has revived debates on 
the role of assassination in US foreign policy. The scholarship tends to ignore the significance 
of the role of the Ford Administration’s ban on assassination in setting the stage for future 
debates. Based largely on archival material and elite interviews, this article provides the first in-
depth account of the Ford Administration’s approach to assassination and the decision-making 
processes that led to the inclusion of a ban on assassination in Executive Order 11905. The 
article argues that discussions within the Ford Administration, the language adopted in 
presenting the Order, and the ban itself actually did not close assassination off completely as an 
option but left it in a status of ‘strategic ambiguity’ that could be exploited by future presidents. 
The article will also challenge two resilient myths: first, the apparently ‘imperilled’ nature of the 
Ford Presidency and second CIA Director William Colby’s alleged supine cooperation with 
Congress. The article shows that, from the start, the administration and the CIA made a 
concerted and successful effort to obstruct intelligence inquiries, to restore the powers and 
reputation of the CIA, and to fend off Congressional assaults on the presidency.  
 
Keywords: Assassination; Ford Administration; CIA; intelligence; Church Committee; 
Congress; Imperial Presidency	  
 
Introduction 
The US government’s reliance on targeted killings has revived academic debate of the role of 
assassination in US foreign policy.1 Within this literature, single case studies have often 
detailed episodes of the early Cold War,2 showing the role of Presidents and of plausible 
deniability in the development and implementation of assassination plots. Several other 
studies - relying on insights from history, international law, and International Relations (IR) - 
have traced the evolution of US law and policy surrounding assassination.  These studies 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Jack MacDonald, Enemies known and unknown (London: Hurst, 2017); Markus Gunneflo, Targeted Killing: a legal and 
political history (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Warner Schilling and Jonathan Schilling, ‘Decision 
making in using assassinations in international relations,’ Political Science Quarterly, 131, no. 3 (2016): 503-539. 
2	  These include, for example, the Eisenhower and Kennedy Administrations’ obsession with Fidel Castro, as well as the US 
efforts against Lumumba. See Don Bohning, The Castro Obsession: U.S. Covert Operations Against Cuba, 1959-1965 
(Lincoln: Potomac Books, 2006) and Ludo de Witte, The Assassination of Lumumba (London: Verso, 2003).	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developed in two main waves. The first wave included studies published from the late 1980s 
to the late 1990s.3  They were inspired by the controversies surrounding the US raid against 
targets in Libya, the so-called CIA ‘assassination manual’ for the Nicaraguan contras, and the 
early airstrikes against Saddam Hussein in Operation Desert Storm.4  The second wave 
largely developed after 9/11 and coincided with the establishment and expansion of the US 
targeted killing program.5 Within these studies, the analysis often identifies the origins of the 
current targeted killing program in the Reagan Administration’s war on terrorism and in the 
administration’s rhetoric surrounding the need to pre-empt terrorist attacks. This literature 
also points to Executive Order (EO) 12333 passed by the Reagan Administration and aimed 
at reforming the intelligence community. The order contained a ban on assassination. This 
ban is seen in the literature as the key moment in defining the position of assassination in the 
US legal and political context. Even in the more recent second wave of research, EO 12333 is 
taken as the starting point of the analysis with limited references to previous 
Administrations.6  
This scholarship on assassination pays little attention to the earlier Executive Order 11905. 
Passed by the Ford Administration, EO11905 is perhaps best knows as the first reform of the 
intelligence community after the Congressional inquiries of the mid-1970s. However, the 
order also included the first version of the ban on assassination. While some scholars mention 
this order, they have not assessed in any great depth how the Administration approached the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Michael Schmitt, ‘State-sponsored assassination in international and domestic law,’ Yale Journal of International Affairs, 
17, no. 2 (1992): 609-685; Thomas Wingfield, ‘Taking aim at regime elites: assassination, tyrannicide and the Clancy 
Doctrine,’ Maryland Journal of International Law, 22, no. 2 (1998): 287-317; Boyd Johnson, ‘Executive Order 12333: the 
permissibility of an American Assassination of a foreign leader,’ Cornell International Law Journal, 25, no. 2 (1992): 401-
435; Louis Beres, ‘The permissibility of state-sponsored assassination during peace and war,’ Temple International and 
Comparative Law Journal, 5 (1991): 231-249; Patricia Zengel, ‘Assassination and the law of armed conflict,’ Military Law 
Review, 134 (1991): 123-156. 
4 See for example David Newman and Tyll van Geel, ‘Executive Order 12333: the risks of a clear declaration of Intent,’ 
Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, 12 (1989): 433-447; Bert Brandenburg, ‘The legality of assassination as an 
aspect of foreign policy,’ Virginia Journal of international Law, 27 (1987): 655-697. 
5 See for example Philip Alston, ‘The CIA and targeted killings beyond borders,’ Harvard National Security Journal, 2 
(2011): 283-446; Nathan Cannestraro, ‘American Law and Policy on assassination of foreign leaders: the practicality of 
maintaining the status quo,’ Boston College International and Comparative Law Review, 26 (2003): 1-34. 
6	  For a recent example see Christopher Fuller, See it/Shoot it: the secret history of the CIA lethal drone programme (London: 
Yale University Press, 2017).	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issue of assassination, the decision-making process within the Ford Administration, how the 
ban came about, and its implications for the development of the role of assassination in US 
policy. In response, this article provides the first in-depth account of the crucial role played 
by the Ford Administration in establishing a ban on US government involvement in 
assassination. The article relies on recently declassified material from the Gerald Ford 
Presidential Library and from the National Security Archives, as well as on semi-structured 
and unstructured interviews with academics and former policymakers. Interviewees included 
members of the Church Committee, as well as former Vice President Mondale and former 
press Secretary Ron Nessen.  
The main argument brought forward by this article is that an analysis of the decisions 
taken by the Ford Administration is essential to understanding the origins and development of 
the US targeted killing program and, in particular, the role of the Executive. These decisions 
prevented the establishment of a law or statute prohibiting assassination, measures supported 
by Congress and by the Ford Administration’s Attorney General. Discussions within the Ford 
Administration, the language adopted in presenting the Executive Order, and the ban itself 
make clear that the aim of the administration was not one of asserting an outright ban; rather 
they left the issue of assassination in a status of ‘strategic ambiguity;’7 that was vague enough 
for future policymakers to interpret it in line with their strategic priorities. To make this 
argument, the analysis will look at three main steps of the Ford Administration’s strategy. 
The first step included the establishment and management of the Rockefeller Commission in 
response to media scandals surrounding the intelligence community. The second step 
included the difficult relationship with the Church Committee. Third, the Administration’s 
decision to publish an Executive Order 11905 to reform the Intelligence Communities and the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 Jacqueline Best identifies three forms of ambiguity. In one of these forms, a term is used in an ‘ambiguous’ way to permit 
various interpretations. In this sense, ambiguity is a ‘strategic asset’ and policymakers aim at governing through ambiguity. 
See Jacqueline Best, ‘Ambiguity, Uncertainty, and Risk: Rethinking Indeterminacy,’ International Political Sociology, 2, no. 
4 (December 2008): 355–374. 
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language of the ban included in the order left the issue of assassination ill-defined and under 
Presidential control. 
The analysis of these steps will also help in challenging some prevailing myths that have 
surrounded the Ford Administration. Several historians have, until recently, argued that the 
Ford Administration was an ‘imperilled’ presidency, unable to challenge a rampant Congress 
and an assertive civil society.8 The analysis will show how the Administration was, from the 
start, aggressive, organised, and committed in its quest to ensure that the investigations of the 
intelligence community did not hamper the Central Intelligence Agency or reduce the powers 
of the president. In doing this, the analysis will update the interpretation of some scholars like 
Loch Johnson and Kathryn Olmsted who, while acknowledging the administration’s effort to 
maintain presidential power, argued that the administration was initially unprepared to 
challenge media scandals and Congressional inquiries.9 Second, the analysis will also 
question a myth - largely propagated by the memoirs of Henry Kissinger and former CIA 
officials – that has emerged around CIA Director William Colby’s alleged willingness to 
cooperate fully with Congress. The article will highlight how this myth has very little basis in 
the historical record, highlighting Colby’s much more secretive approach and his ultimate 
aim of protecting the Agency.   
 
Stage managing the Rockefeller Commission 
The commission and the mandate 
On the 22nd of December 1974, Seymour Hersh published a New York Times story titled: 
‘Huge CIA Operation reported in US against anti-war forces, other dissidents in Nixon 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  See	  Katherine Scott, Reining in the state (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2013) and Andrew Rudalevige, The New 
Imperial Presidency: Renewing Presidential Power after Watergate (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2009) 
9	  Loch Johnson and Kathryn Olmsted have provided detailed analyses of the Administration’s reaction to Congressional 
inquiries. In their account, however, both Johnson and Olmsted suggest that the Ford Administration’s initial reaction was 
somewhat clumsy and unorganised and that it relied on a late counter-offensive. See Kathryn Olmsted, 'Reclaiming 
executive power: the Ford Administration's response to the Intelligence investigations,' Presidential Studies Quarterly, 26, 
no. 3 (1996): 725-737; Kathryn Olmsted, Challenging the Secret Government (Chapel Hill: The University of North 
Carolina Press, 1996); Loch Johnson, A Season of Inquiry (Lexington: The University Press of Kentucky, 1985). 
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years.’ The story created a political storm by exposing the CIA involvement in the wire-
tapping of US citizens and other domestic activities in violation of the CIA’s statute.10 
Hersh’s story was based on access to part of the so-called ‘family jewels,’ a collection of 
documents compiled in 1973 at the request of then CIA Director James Schlesinger. Both 
CIA Director William Colby and Schlesinger (who became Secretary of Defense under Ford) 
had failed to inform the White House regarding the ‘jewels.’11 Colby had agreed to discuss 
the story with Hersh. As he recalled years later, Colby felt that he owed the Times’ reporter a 
favour. Hersh had agreed not to publish a story on the Glomar Explorer operation.12 
Furthermore, the DCI was afraid that Head of Counter-intelligence James Angleton, whom 
Colby was ready to fire, was behind the leaks to Hersh.13 Colby had agreed to meet with 
Hersh and, as he put it, he was ‘hoping to bring him down.’ Hersh, however, took the 
conversation as confirmation that he was on the right track.14 Hersh initial story did not 
include assassination, but the topic would soon become one of the White House’s main 
concerns.  
With President Ford ready to depart for his Christmas vacation, National Security 
Advisor/Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, Chief of Staff Donald Rumsfeld and Dick 
Cheney, Deputy Assistant to the President, took control of the Executive’s reaction. Early in 
the morning of the 23rd, Kissinger wrote Rumsfeld that, in terms of public reaction, the three 
key aims were: to insure that no activities were taking place, to establish corrective measures 
if they were taking place, and to assure the American public that the president had ‘firm 
control over the activities of the CIA.’ The approach aimed at managing the crisis and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 As Cynthia Nolan has shown, the storm engulfed the Executive and Congress more than the American public. Cynthia M. 
Nolan, 'Seymour Hersh's Impact on the CIA,' International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence, 12, no. 1 
(1999): 22. 
11 William Colby, Honorable Men: my life in the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1978): 345. 
12 Nicholas Dujmovic, ‘Oral History: Reflections of DCI Colby and Helms on the CIA’s “Time of Troubles,”’ Studies in 
Intelligence, 51, no. 3, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-
studies/studies/vol51no3/reflections-of-dci-colby-and-helms-on-the-cia2019s-201ctime-of-troubles201d.html (accessed 19 
July 2017).  
13 Harold P. Ford, William E. Colby as Director of Central Intelligence (Central Intelligence Agency: CIA History Staff, 
1993): 103. 
14 Dujmovic, ‘Oral history.’ 
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revealing as little as possible. ‘We are concerned,’ Kissinger wrote, ‘that we not act in such a 
way as to give credence to the allegations of the New York Times story and create an 
impression that a major problem actually exists and that the Ford Administration is 
confronted with a scandal of major proportions.’ The aim was to ‘head off…a full-blown 
Congressional investigation.’15 On the same day, Rumsfeld told Kissinger that Ford agreed 
with the suggestion that the first step was to have Colby write a report on the CIA activities. 
Rumsfeld also put Cheney in charge of all communications to the President regarding the 
crisis.16 
On the 24th, Colby met with Kissinger to discuss the intelligence activities and his report. 
Kissinger, from the start, despised Colby. As Randall Woods has argued, ‘Nixon and 
Kissinger considered Colby a bureaucrat, a political non entity who could easily be controlled 
and from whom they had nothing to fear.’17 Furthermore, Colby had been particularly open 
with Congress during investigations regarding CIA activities in Chile and he had implied that 
former DCI Richard Helms had lied to Congress; a ‘cover-your-ass’ performance in 
Kissinger’s book.18 Colby on his part had trouble getting access to Ford and recognised the 
difficulties of ‘elbowing’ past Kissinger.19 At the meeting, Colby orally provided details on 
assassinations attempts, but those were not included in the report. On Christmas Day, 
Kissinger summarised his meeting with Colby to the President. He expressed concern about 
the propriety and morality of some of the CIA’s activities.20 Ford had already decided on a 
blue-ribbon commission. Kissinger gave his ‘strong recommendation’ that this commission 
be limited to Hersh’s allegations. Crucially, this would have permitted to exclude an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Memo Kissinger to Rumsfeld, ‘Public handling of New York Times allegations of CIA domestic activities,’ 23 December 
1974, Richard Cheney Files (RCF), Box 6, Intelligence Subseries, Folder Intelligence – General, Gerald Ford Presidential 
Library (GFPL). 
16 Memo, Rumsfeld to Kissinger, ‘Kissinger/Rumsfeld telephone conversation, 7:30a.m., December 23, 1974, on CIA 
matter,’ RCF, Box 5, Intelligence Subseries, Folder Intelligence - Colby Report, GFPL. 
17 Randall B. Woods, Shadow Warrior: William Egan Colby and the CIA (New York: Basic Books, 2013): 362. 
18 Memorandum of conversation, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, 21 October 1974, National Security Adviser (NSA) - 
Memoranda of Conversations (MemCon), 1973-1977, Box 6, Digital Files GFPL. 
19 Colby, Honorable, 373. 
20 John Prados, Lost Crusader: the Secret Wars of CIA Director William Colby (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003): 
295. 
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investigation into assassinations.21 For one week, members of the Administration met in Vail 
to discuss how to approach the crisis. Colby was excluded.22 Only on the 3rd of January, with 
the key decision on the establishment of a commission already taken, was Colby given an 
opportunity to brief the president on his report and on assassinations.  
Contrary to Olmsted’s interpretation, even at this early stage, the administration’s 
approach was focused. It aimed at protecting the Agency, at excluding Congress, and at 
keeping secrets. Clues can be found in both private discussions on the future of the inquiry 
and in the approach taken to create and manage the commission. The President clarified the 
necessity of a positive spin on the story. ‘I plan to say,’ he argued, ‘that a Central Intelligence 
Agency is essential to our national security…it has to be put positively.’23 Similarly, Ford 
rejected earlier suggestions from Colby and others within the executive branch that Colby’s 
report should be made public.24 The record makes clear the origin of this emphasis on 
secrecy. In a separate meeting between Kissinger and Ford, the National Security Advisor 
warned the president: ‘What is happening is worse than in the days of McCarthy.’ Kissinger 
criticised Colby suggesting that the time had come to find a replacement.25 The following 
day, Ford met with former CIA Director Richard Helms. The president expressed concerns 
regarding the commission: ‘I hope they [the Commission] will stay within their charter, but in 
this climate, we can't guarantee it. It would be tragic if it went beyond it.’ And he added that 
the aim was to ‘protect the functions of the Agency with a Blue Ribbon group which will 
operate responsibly.’26 As Graeme Mount has correctly argued, the commission’s aim was to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 Memo, Kissinger to President, ‘Colby Report,’ 25 Dec. 1975, RCF, Box 5, Intelligence Subseries, Folder Intelligence - 
Appointment of CIA Director, Folder Intelligence - Colby Report, GFPL. 
22 Colby, Honorable, 397. 
23 Memoranda of conversation, Ford, Colby, Buchen, Marsh, Scowcroft, 3 January 1975 and Ford, Schlesinger, Marsh, 
Buchen, 3 January 1975, NSA - MemCon, 1973-1977, Box 8, Digital Files, GFPL. 
24 Colby, Honorable, 397 and Notes of meeting 27 December 1974, RCF, Box 5, Intelligence Subseries, Folder Intelligence 
- Colby Report, GFPL and Notes of Meeting, Ford, Schlesinger, Marsh, Buchen, 3 January 1975, Richard Cheney Files, Box 
5, Intelligence Subseries, Folder Intelligence - Colby Report, GFPL. 
25 Memorandum of Conversation, Ford, Kissinger, Scowcroft, 4 January 1975, NSA - MemCon, 1973-1977, Box 8, Digital 
Files, GFPL. 
26 Memorandum of conversation, Ford, Rockefeller, Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Buchen, Marsh, Scowcroft, 4 January 1975, NSA 
- MemCon, 1973-1977, Box 8, Digital Files, GFPL. 
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placate the public and Congress, not to seek the truth.27 The White House’s aim was also to 
obstruct the commission’s work. ‘They did not want to do much with it,’ as Vice President 
Walter Mondale recently stated in an interview with the author.28 The composition of the 
commission and its mandate confirm this interpretation. 
In a meeting discussing the newly established commission, even Rumsfeld conceded that 
the commission was ‘a little Republican and right.’29 The commission was also ‘a little male 
and white.’ All members were white males above fifty. The age of the commissioners was 
particularly important as all of them had grown up through the Second World War and the 
immediate post-Cold War consensus regarding the need for a muscular approach to Soviet 
expansionism.30 Moreover, the commission gave clear signs regarding the approach taken 
towards the intelligence community and Congress. In spite of famous historical precedents 
like the Warren Commission (of which Congressman Ford had been a member) and in spite 
of calls from members of the Administration like Schlesinger,31 no member of Congress was 
included.32 The background of the commissioners was also indicative. As Kenneth Kitts 
explains, most members had strong ties to the intelligence community. General Lyman 
Lemnitzer was Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff during the Bay of Pigs. Douglas Dillon 
had helped establish the OSS during World War II. Above all, the Chairman (Vice President) 
Nelson Rockefeller had served on the President’s Foreign Intelligence Advisory Board since 
1969.33 Beyond the commissioners, the White House also carefully selected the staff. As one 
member of the staff concluded: ‘because of the type of individual on the commission and on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 Graeme Mount (with Mark Gauthier), 895 days that changed the world (London: Black Rose Books, 2006): 143. 
28 Walter Mondale, Interview with the author, 26th May 2016 
29 Memorandum of conversation, Ford, Rockefeller, Kissinger, Rumsfeld, Buchen, Marsh, Scowcroft, 4 January 1975. 
30 John M. Oseth, Regulating US Intelligence operations (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1985): 77. 
31 Memorandum of conversation, Ford, Schlesinger, Marsh, Buchen, 3 January 1975. 
32 Kenneth Kitts, 'Commission Politics and National Security: Gerald Ford's response to the CIA controversy of 1975,' 
Presidential Studies Quarterly, 26, no. 4 (Fall 1996): 1085 
33 Kitts, ‘Commission,’ 1086. 
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the staff, little credence was given to the wilder accusations regarding the CIA.’34 The White 
House also made sure of this by drafting a very narrow mandate for the commission.  
Executive Order 11828 established the commission. Both the Order’s preamble and Ford’s 
announcement focused on the need for strengthening, as opposed to investigating, the CIA.35 
As to the mandate, the commission was strictly limited to investigating ‘activities conducted 
within the United States’ that violated statutory requirements. While the broader debate was 
already discussing the impropriety of the CIA activities and their immorality, the Order 
narrowly focused on their legal status.36 Furthermore, the mandate was limited to an 
investigation of the ‘public charges’ and ‘allegations.’ The sources of these were never 
specified and the commission could decide (guided by the White House) which charges to 
investigate and which to ignore.37 Finally, the mandate made clear that the various agencies 
should have cooperated with the commission. The commission had to rely on the CIA to 
reveal its own secrets. Colby famously described Rockefeller’s approach. After his testimony 
to the commission, Rockefeller approached Colby: ‘Bill,’ he cautioned, ‘do you really have to 
present all this material to us?’38 
 
A new ball game: assassinations and the Ford Administration 
The issue of US government involvement in assassinations was not included in Hersh’s 
story, or in Colby’s report to the President. Colby only briefed Kissinger and the President on 
them between late December 1974 and early January 1975. Ford knew of the assassination 
attempts before he established the commission but, by limiting the mandate, excluded the 
commission from investigating them. This point also makes Ford’s revelations on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Kitts, ‘Commission,’ 1086. 
35 Gerald Ford, ‘Statement Announcing Establishment of a Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States,’ 
January 4, 1975, http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=4838&st=Commission&st1= (accessed 4 January 2018) 
and Executive Order 11828 - Establishing a Commission on CIA Activities Within the United States, January 4, 1975, 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=23910 (accessed July 19th 2017). 
36 Executive Order 11828. 
37 Oseth, Regulating, 74. 
38 Colby, Honorable, 400. 
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assassination even more baffling. On the 16th of January, during a lunch with journalists, Ford 
rejected the criticisms that the Rockefeller Commission was too conservative. He explained 
the selection of personnel suggesting that more liberal commissioners might have exposed 
darker secrets of the CIA. Asked to clarify what he meant, Ford uttered: ‘like assassination,’ 
before adding that the revelation was off the record.39  
The reasons behind Ford’s revelation are still heavily debated. Some have argued that the 
revelation was simply a mistake, largely due to Ford’s inexperience and his willingness to 
impress journalists.40 John Greene has, unconvincingly, suggested that the revelations on 
assassination represented an attempt to distract the media and public opinion from the work 
of the commission.41 Finally, according to journalist Daniel Schorr, Ford’s aim was simply to 
off-load the issue on Rockefeller.42 This article identifies a fourth option which seems more 
plausible seems more plausible. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones has argued that one of Ford’s main 
aims in approaching the intelligence inquiries was to protect the Republican Party and to stop 
the post-Watergate slide.43 A tactic that had proved successful in the Nixon years and would 
later help members of the Ford Administration was the so called ‘flash-back’ tactic, that is, 
demonstrating that questionable CIA practices had started in earlier (and crucially 
Democratic) administrations.44 Ford’s revelation on assassination fits this pattern. It was an 
opportunity to hit back at the democrats by implicating the Kennedy Administration. The 
journalists who had attended the lunch with Ford had respected the President’s request, but 
Ford’s revelation made its way to CBS reporter Daniel Schorr who - after a phone 
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conversation with Colby45 and his own investigation - went on air with the story regarding 
assassination.  
Ford’s revelation has generally been understood as the primary reason behind the 
extension of the Rockefeller’s commission mandate.46 The record and especially the 
generally overlooked papers of David Belin, the commission’s staff Director, available at the 
Gerald Ford Presidential Library, however, present a different picture. Early in the 
commission’s investigation, Belin had requested the CIA a copy of the ‘family jewels.’ In 
spite of the EO’s call for cooperation, the CIA had been less than forthcoming. The copy 
provided did not include the discussion of assassination since the CIA considered the material 
extremely sensitive and outside the scope of the commission’s inquiry. Only at Belin’s 
insistence, the material was disclosed.47 Only through Belin’s pressure, assassination attempts 
involving domestic abuses were added to the mandate. White House Counsel Philip Buchen, 
however, made clear to Belin that the extension of the mandate did not affect the White 
House’s control on the process. As Buchen wrote:  
Once you complete your investigation in that regard, you should advise the 
President of the outcome, through me, and then it can be decided whether the 
subject should eventually be included as an integral part of the Commission's final 
report.48  
 
The tight leash is confirmed by the conduct of investigations. It is clear that assassination 
represented an altogether different territory; one where the CIA, the White House and 
Kissinger were unwilling to venture.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Dujmovic, ‘Oral history,’ and Colby, Honorable, 409. In the conversation, Colby denied that the CIA had conducted 
assassination attempts in the United States which, to Schorr, meant that the Agency had done so abroad. 
46 See Olmsted, ‘Reclaiming,’ 727 and Daniel Schorr, Clearing the Air (New York: Berkley Medallion Books, 1978): 147. 
47 David Belin, ‘Inside the CIA: the Belin report’ David W Belin Papers (DWBP) (1961), 1963-1998, Box 55, Book files, 
Draft Chapter 7, ‘The “Family Jewels,”’ p. 8-4 [sic], GFPL. The files include draft chapters for the book ‘Inside the CIA.’ 
The book was never published. Material from these chapters was eventually included in David Belin, Final disclosure: the 
full truth about the assassination of President Kennedy (Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 1988). In this case, however, the 
account available in the book tends to downplay Belin’s role and the opposition from within the rest of the Commission to 
the investigation of assassination. See, in particular, the difference between the ‘Second Revision’ draft of Chapter 7, ‘The 
Family Jewels’ and the “Family Jewels’ Chapter in the book. In the book, Chapter 16, ‘The Battle to investigate 
assassination plots’ is also vague on the reasons and protagonists of this battle.  
48 Letter, Philip Buchen to David Belin, 31 March 1975, DWBP (1961), 1963-1998, Box 26, Rockefeller Commission 
Numbered files, Folder C-21 Correspondence – White House 1975, GFPL. 
12	  
	  
In a letter to Belin in early May, Peter Clapper, Director of Public affairs for the 
commission, lamented the Agency’s lack of cooperation. ‘I will not be easily convinced,’ he 
wrote, ‘that the week-long delay between the time when I requested to see certain Helms files 
and the time when I was allowed to view them was not used by the Agency to cull from those 
files potentially damaging material.’ The suspicion was confirmed by chronological gaps and 
by the fact that the Inspector General was assigned the task of controlling Clapper while he 
was going through the documents. Clapper felt he was being ‘spoon-fed.’49 Belin confronted 
the same delaying tactics in dealing with Kissinger. As he recalled, Kissinger had an 
enormous influence on the activities of the commission through his strong personal 
relationship with Rockefeller. After a testimony by McGeorge Bundy, Belin requested a 
series of documents from the National Security Council. These documents could have 
clarified on the president’s level of knowledge on assassination plots. A series of requests 
was sent to Executive Secretary of the NSC, Jeanne Davis without success. Only when Belin 
threatened to ask Kissinger about the documents during his testimony to the commission, 
Mrs. Davis replied but she implied that Kissinger would have the power to decide what 
interpretation (and what documents) to give. A frustrated Belin asked Rockefeller to 
intervene. After Rockefeller’s discussion with Scowcroft, Belin was granted access to a 
narrow set of documents through a literal interpretation of his request. Not all the files were 
sent and after Belin’s complaint, Mrs. Davis suggested that Kissinger had already decided not 
to give access to other files. The NSC, Belin concluded, had tried to ‘stonewall’ the 
investigation. The delay exploited the tight deadline under which the commission was 
working. Additional documents arrived only on the 30th of May, one week before the 
deadline for the completion of the report. More importantly, an internal memorandum from 
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April had already made clear that Kissinger’s office would not comply with Belin’s request. 
Assurances of cooperation, Belin concluded, were ‘garbage.’ ‘The real intent from the very 
beginning was to deny access.’50 Kissinger’s influence would also determine the shape of the 
final report. 
With the commission’s investigation coming to a close, on the 12th of May, Dillon and 
Rockefeller let the media know that the report would soon be released, including a section on 
assassination.51 In the last week of May, however, a request came from the White House and 
Kissinger to exclude the final chapter on assassination. The decision was taken in spite of 
several commissioners and members of staff being concerned for the public relations impact 
of this decision.52 Belin considered holding a press conference to reveal his frustration and 
the extent of the CIA’s activities. While Nessen approved, in theory, of the idea of a press 
conference, Cheney prevented him from going public.53 On the 6th of June the report was 
released. As John Prados and Arturo Jimenez Bacardi have detailed, the published report was 
very different from the initial draft produced by the commission. Cheney heavily re-drafted 
portions of the report and edited several sections to reduce the criticism of the CIA.54 The 
largest cover-up, however, concerned assassinations. Not only was Chapter 20 not included, 
but a short paragraph implied that, although the President had agreed to the commission’s 
investigation of alleged assassination plots, the commission did not have time to conduct such 
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investigation.55 Once again, the record shows a very different story. Already on the 15th of 
April, Belin had notified Buchen that an interim report would be completed shortly and that it 
was being drafted with a view of providing it to the Senate Committee.56 In this sense, 
although at the time the commission’s report was not considered a ‘whitewash,’ the issue of 
assassination had a special status.  
 
Don’t take me to Church: the Ford White House, the Church Committee and 
assassination  
Limiting the Committee and controlling information 
As Kissinger’s initial reaction made clear, one of the main aims of the White House was to 
prevent a ‘full-blown’ Congressional investigation.57 Such an approach was unlikely to 
succeed. Watergate had not only made investigations of the CIA ‘fair game’, but it had also 
brought to Washington a new wave of Congressmen determined to rebalance the power 
between the Executive and the Legislative branches.58 Colby understood this changed mood 
and, as he recalled, adopted an approach that – by releasing targeted information - could both 
placate Congress’s investigative zeal and preserve the Agency’s powers intact.59 Following 
this approach, on the 15th of January, Colby testified to a joint session of the Senate’s Armed 
Services and Appropriations Committee. To the White House’s dismay Colby not only used 
the Vail report in his testimony, but agreed to its publication, going against Ford’s decision.60 
Robert McFarlane, NSA Assistant, lamented at the time that Colby had provided a lot of 
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‘gratuitous information,’ without explaining the vital role played by the Agency.61 Kissinger 
noted in his memoirs that Colby’s performance guaranteed that the Rockefeller Commission 
would not be enough to moderate public, media, and Congressional calls for investigations.62 
Congress, however, was already too invested in the issue, regardless of Colby’s testimony. 
The ‘Watergate babies,’ as Laura Kalman put it, ‘did not sleep, they screamed.’63 Less than a 
week after Colby’s testimony, the Senate voted to create a Select Committee to investigate 
CIA activities, chaired by Idaho Senator Frank Church.  
Once again, although, as Olmsted correctly points out, the White House’s approach 
became more aggressive in the fall of 1975, with the establishment of the Intelligence 
Coordinating Group,64 from the start, the Executive made an effort to limit the extent and 
depth of Congressional investigations. The White House clearly aimed at giving a public 
impression of cooperation. Both the President and Press Secretary Ron Nessen made clear 
that the White House was open to full cooperation and broadly agreed with the need for 
investigation.65 As Frederick Schwartz recently confirmed, the White House could not be 
seen as not cooperating with Congress.66 The façade of cooperation created a ‘velvet 
stonewall,’ an impression of amiability and cooperation which covered the real aims of the 
White House.67 Key players in the White House showed little more than contempt for the 
Congressional effort. Kissinger often repeated in telephone conversations his lack of 
‘sympathy’ for the investigations and his hostility towards Congressional requests.68 
Memoranda of conversation from early 1975 confirm the Administration’s concerns 
regarding the breadth of the Church Committee investigations and, in particular, its 
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willingness to explore covert actions, including assassination attempts.69 In its containment 
effort, the White House replicated many of the strategies adopted against the commission. 
First, the Executive made an effort to limit the breadth of the committee’s investigations. This 
included efforts to intimidate the committee, the use of Republicans on the Committee as 
‘fifth columns,’ and leaks to discredit the Committee.  Second, in spite of a façade of 
cooperation, as with the commission, the Executive carefully managed the process for the 
release of documents and information. Finally, the Administration engaged in an all-out effort 
to keep the work of the Committee on assassination secret.70 
Intimidation relied on both direct warnings and elements of ‘theatre.’ In the immediate 
aftermath of Ford’s revelation on assassination, Kissinger reported to Ford that he had scared 
Church at a dinner party telling him that the ‘Nixon material was mild compared to what 
went on in Democratic Administration;’71 another example of flash-back. Similarly, Colby’s 
briefing to the Chairman of the Committee and to the Vice Chairman, Republican John 
Tower (R-TX), was devised to impress on them the importance of the intelligence work and 
induce the Committee to ‘impose limitations on further investigation.’72 More generally, the 
White House did not hesitate to deploy the trappings of Executive power to intimidate young 
and (at times inexperienced) investigators. In an account not too dissimilar from that of 
Clapper, Frederick Baron recalled how the White House stage managed the access to 
documents by giving him very little time, by arranging to have a guard stand next to him as 
he went through boxes and boxes of documents, and by having him read the documents in the 
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Situation Room. As he put it, the White House ‘orchestrated the drama’ of the event.73 As to 
the Republican ‘fifth column,’ Goldwater and Tower kept in constant communication with 
the White House. Hugh Scott (R-PA), the minority leader, asked Senator Tower to act as 
‘damage control’ officer in the Committee. A member of Goldwater’s staff warned Frederick 
Schwarz that he wasn’t there to help the committee but to spy on it.74 Finally, the White 
House adopted from the start a policy of leaks to discredit the Committee. US Deputy 
Attorney General Laurence Silberman made clear in a meeting in early 1975, that the White 
House position would be strengthened if the Committee seemed to leak information first.75 
The White House also carefully managed the process of document and information 
release. On this score, Kissinger and Helms have (in their memoirs) propagated the myth that 
Colby was out of control giving the Committee everything it wanted.76 The record, however, 
shows that this ‘Colby myth’ is unfounded. The release of documents, the permission to give 
oral testimonies to the Committee, and the contents of these testimonies were controlled from 
the White House. The CIA, far from being out of control, largely followed White House 
guidelines. From the start of the inquiry, Colby and the CIA developed a central index to 
track all the documents requested by the Committee, as well as a typology including four 
different level of classification for these documents. Sensitive material would not be available 
to the committee in its ‘raw form,’ but investigators would only receive oral briefings. 
Documents in a second category could be viewed only at the originating agency and might 
have been subject to restrictions from such agency. As Schwarz complained, the power of 
each agency to decide what to do with documents was a source of ‘total frustration’ for the 
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committee and the staff.77 Documents in a third category would be provided only in a 
sanitized form. Finally, only a small amount of (mostly generic) documents would be 
provided to the committee in its original form.78 The CIA also made widespread use of 
‘abstracts.’ These short summaries of much larger and potentially more controversial 
documents gave the impression of collaboration while revealing very little.79  
Colby also adopted two main tactics to influence the investigations. First, as Rhodri 
Jeffreys-Jones has recently put it, Colby released documents on case-studies and only 
targeted information. This prevented the Committee from exploring broader issues regarding 
the CIA’s nature and culture.80 Second, to cover potentially controversial issues, Colby 
adopted a strategy aimed at quantity more than quality of documents.81 Many key issues, as 
Harold Ford concluded, got lost in the reams of paper that surrounded the Committee.82 The 
White House similarly limited its collaboration with the Committee. Ford made clear, in an 
early meeting with the Committee Chairmen that he intended to restore the reputation and the 
strength of the intelligence community. He refused to give directives to the CIA and to other 
agencies to cooperate. Ford stressed that any decision would be taken on a case by case 
basis.’83 Furthermore, as a White House memo made clear, from early in the investigations, 
any document had to be ‘cleared through the Counsel’s office’ before being supplied to the 
Committee.84 
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The same controlled process applied to oral testimonies. In this context, the management 
of Colby’s 15th of May testimony to the Committee is instructive. On the 9th of May, a memo 
to the President recommended that Colby should not have been allowed to testify in front of 
the whole Church Committee, but only to the chairmen. The recommendation also suggested 
that Colby should have discussed ‘in detail’ with them the nature and extent of various covert 
operations.85 The same day, however, the President refused such recommendation permitting 
Colby to brief the chairmen but only to discuss the background and rationale of covert 
operations with no reference to real cases. The testimony should also have been cleared with 
the White House in advance.86 On the 13th, Colby was given the opportunity to rehearse his 
briefing at White House. The rehearsal, however, was ‘not well received.’ In particular, 
Colby should have stressed the importance of covert operations for US security instead of 
downplaying their necessity and their successes, as he seemed ready to do.87 Having gone 
through this process, on the 15th, Colby delivered a very generic testimony on the nature and 
rationale of covert action to a closed session of the committee. Furthermore, duplicating the 
approach to the release of documents, Colby and officials from the Executive proved very 
good at revealing generalities or at telling the Committee things it already knew.88 
 
The assassination report: the fight over transfer and release  
The release of information became a particularly controversial issue when it came to the 
material on assassination plots. Various authors suggest that after mis-handling the 
Rockefeller Commission’s report, Ford was compelled by media and public pressure to agree 
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to transfer the assassination material held by the commission to the Church Committee.89 The 
record, however, shows that the White House was extremely concerned regarding this 
transfer, that it limited the type of documents passed to the Committee, and that it agreed to 
the transfer only through the understanding that the documents would not be released. On the 
first point, a meeting between Kissinger and Ford on the 5th of June, one day before the 
publication of the Rockefeller Commission’s report, clarified all the grave concerns regarding 
assassination and the possible transfer of documents. Demonstrating the sensitive nature of 
assassinations and the White House concern with the issue, Ford suggested that he feared that 
Church might ‘sensationalize’ the inquiry by focusing on assassination. Furthermore, the 
same meeting makes clear the president’s main concern. As Ford put it, the White House 
should have been ‘careful’ in making statements regarding assassination, since Church might 
have decided to write them into law. 90 A law represented the worst-case scenario for the 
White House. It would have constrained Ford’s powers and those of future presidents.  
In a memorandum, Cheney, who was still in control of communications between the 
President and other officials, highlighted that the transfer of documents posed a conundrum: 
the commission had received only material from the CIA and had been denied access to 
documents from other areas of the Executive branch such as the Special Group. This created 
an unbalanced picture in which the CIA appeared as the only branch of government involved 
in assassinations plots. Passing the same material on to the Church Committee would confirm 
such biased picture. The delivery of documents from other groups within the executive 
dealing with covert actions, on the contrary, would be ‘unprecedented,’ with ‘incalculable 
diplomatic ramifications’ in case of leaks.91 McFarlane make clear how the release of those 
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documents would be ‘irresponsible.’92 Such a release might have exposed the role of 
Presidents and other officials in directing the CIA’s covert actions.  
The administration’s solution was the adoption of even more selective practices of release. 
First, documents would be heavily redacted. In April, notified by Belin that the Rockefeller 
Commission had prepared a draft of the chapter on assassination, White House officials 
James Wilderotter suggested that the commission should limit the documents shared with the 
Church Committee. In particular, the 1973 Inspector General report on assassinations should 
have been provided only in a heavily redacted form and, more importantly, changes to the 
document should have been made to reduce the impression that it had been redacted.93 
Second, certain documents would be kept secret altogether. In a letter to Colby, Church had 
identified six main areas with a connection to assassination that the Committee wanted to 
explore. The Executive’s reaction was to try to placate Church’s requests by having CIA 
officials brief the Committee. However, some recognised that the Committee would not be 
satisfied. The strategy adopted to avoid a ‘complete impasse’ was to provide documents on 
operations and topics already known. Even on these, however, ‘papers evidencing the 
approval process such as proposals or recommendations made to the President or to groups 
which advised the President, as well as deliberations within such groups’ would be 
excluded.94 As Robert McFarlane concluded, the NSC adopted an ‘extremely conservative 
approach.’95 The CIA agreed, as E. H. Knoche, Colby’s Special Assistant for the 
investigations wrote: ‘all White House papers, NSC related reports on meetings and 
deliberations, 40 committee minutes or any documents relating to advice given to the 
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President or to decisions made by him are to be isolated from the files to which the SSC is 
given access.’96 The Committee was, in other words, prevented from accessing documents 
essential to its investigation, receiving only a limited amount of material. As Loch Johnson 
chronicled, even the release of this material proved extremely difficult.97 
Finally, the record makes clear that Ford and other White House officials had conceded to 
transfer the documents only based on the assumption that they would not be made public. As 
Jack Marsh wrote the President, ‘you provided the documents on the express assumption that 
they would be used in a responsible manner.’98 As news reached the White House that the 
Senate Committee was ready to publish an interim report on assassination attempts, this 
assumption seemed to crumble. The issue was discussed at a meeting on the 13th of October. 
From the record, Ford appears shocked: ‘I think this is a more highly sensitive area than any 
we have had,’ he stated. ‘I never assumed they had the right to publish this.’ Warned by 
Attorney General Levi that the White House had no legal option to prevent publication, Ford 
was still unsatisfied: ‘I said they had to handle these assassination documents as we had and 
we released none of them.’99 The rest of the meeting, as well as the steps taken by the White 
House, show that the problem had nothing to do with the type of information revealed but 
with the impact this had on the reputation of the intelligence community and on the balance 
between the Executive and Legislative branches. At the meeting, in fact, Buchen tried to put 
the problem into perspective: ‘all we are fighting,’ he told the President, ‘is official 
confirmation of material which is already widely known. This is not a good issue on which to 
go to the mat.’ Ford was not persuaded: ‘I think we should review it and then say it is not in 
the national interest to release it at all.’ Kissinger agreed stating explicitly that the issue 
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impinged on the power of the Executive.100 The Church Committee had agreed to let the 
executive review the interim report. Officials from State, Defense and the CIA reviewed it 
and recommended against. All agreed that the publication of the report would do ‘irreparable 
damage’ to both US national security and the reputation of the United States.101 The 
document from William Hyland, from the State Department is, in this context, indicative. 
Hyland made clear that, beyond the report itself, a greater issue was at stake. The release of 
the report would be taken as a defining precedent for the balance of power between the 
Executive and the Legislative branches.102 Agreeing with this assessment, Colby and Ford 
started an all-out effort to prevent the publication. They wrote letters to all the Senators on 
the Committee explaining the dramatic National Security implications of a release of 
information. Colby even held a public press conference to convince the Senate not to publish 
the report.103 Only Senator Church’s insistence and his threat to resign led to the publication 
of the interim report on the 20th of November. 
 
‘What was tried in the past may once again become a temptation:’ strategic ambiguity, 
Ford and Executive Order 11905 
The assassination report discussed several case studies of US government involvement in 
assassination. More importantly, it discussed the CIA’s culture and the relations between the 
Agency and the Executive. It made clear that assassination plots had emerged in the 
atmosphere of secrecy surrounding the CIA and that this secrecy had been compounded by 
the intense pressure exercised by the White House (under several administrations) to get 
results against enemies of the United States. The report argued that ‘certain officials might 
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have perceived that, according to their judgment and experience, assassination was an 
acceptable course of action.’ The report, in other words, lamented the ambiguity surrounding 
the issues of assassination and the fact that such ambiguity left the door open to exploitation 
from both the CIA and officials within the Executive Branch. Responsibility lay with both 
these CIA officials and with various Administration officials who had not explicitly ruled out 
the use of assassination.104 The report’s recommendations reflected these concerns.  
The report recognised the CIA internal directives banning assassination but called for the 
strongest legal instruments to prevent the reoccurrence of the practice in the future. 
‘Administrations change,’ the report read, ‘CIA Directors change, and someday in the future 
what was tried in the past may once again become a temptation…A law is needed…to resist 
the temptation.’105 This law would have made it a criminal offence ‘to conspire within or 
outside the United States against a foreign official…to attempt to assassinate a foreign 
official or…to assassinate a foreign official.’ In particular, the report was very clear as to the 
definition of foreign official. It included an ‘insurgent force, an unrecognized government, or 
a political party.’ The killing of any of these officials would be punishable if ‘politically 
motivated’ that is due to the officials’ ‘political views, actions, or statements.’106 The 
Committee made clear that the report would not apply in case of war. As the recommendation 
read: ‘absent a declaration of war or the introduction of United States Armed Forces pursuant 
to the War Powers Resolution, the killing of foreign official on account of their political 
views would be a criminal offence.’107 The recommendations called for the establishment of a 
statute that could deny flexibility to current and future presidents and identified very specific 
criteria to define assassination. It is interesting to note that Attorney General Levi made a 
similar argument at the time. In a memorandum to Ford, Levi wrote that the ‘state of the law’ 
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on several issues related to the intelligence community was ‘unsatisfactory.’ The lack of a 
federal law prohibiting assassination was a particularly glaring omission and Levi suggested 
that the administration should give ‘enthusiastic…support’ to the legislation proposed by the 
Committee.108 Elements in the White House, however, disagreed with this view. As we have 
seen, from the start of Church’s investigations, Ford himself had precisely feared that 
Congress might put into law regulations on the intelligence community. In a remarkable 
outburst, Kissinger had made clear that a law would have been particularly dangerous in the 
realm of assassination. ‘It is an act of insanity and national humiliation,’ he had stated in 
National Security Council meeting, ‘to have a law prohibiting the President from ordering 
assassination.’109 This view prevailed.  
Ford’s Executive Order 11905 reforming the intelligence community was published in 
February 1976. In terms of tone, as John Oseth has argued, 'the order was by no means an act 
of executive contrition. Much of it reads, in fact, as if the major national concern in 1976 was 
to strengthen, rather than to constrain, our intelligence capabilities.’110 The text of the Order 
showed no sign that questionable activities had occurred. As to the atmosphere of secrecy, the 
Order established oversight tools but they were toothless and contained within the 
Executive.111 The position of the President in regard to the intelligence community was 
strengthened.112 These elements, Oseth concluded reflected the real nature of the Executive 
Order as a manoeuvre to pre-empt Congressional action more than a genuine effort at 
reform.113 What is missing is Oseth analysis, however, is the stark contrast between the 
Church Committee’s approach to assassination and that of the EO. Whereas the Church 
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Committee report (and Levi) had called for specific criteria and lack of flexibility the 
Executive Order seemed to advocate the exact opposite. 
A draft of Ford’s statement announcing the Executive Order, clarifies the White House’s 
priority on flexibility. ‘We must strike a sensible balance,’ the draft read: 
Between the need for durable standards and sufficient flexibility to enable me and 
future Presidents to react appropriately to changing world conditions…We must 
never bind our own hands so tightly that we become a helpless giant in a very real 
and very hostile world.114 
 
A law and specific criteria would have prevented current and future Administrations from 
exploiting definitional ambiguities. Ford had no desire to cede power to Congress and to tie 
his hands or those of future presidents.115 Whereas the Church Committee had clearly 
specified the meaning of political, the categories included in ‘foreign officials’ and the 
international conditions that made the killing of a foreign official a crime, the ban on 
assassination included in the Order simply stated: ‘No employee of the United States 
Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political assassination.’116 As Bruce 
Riedel recently argued, ‘The EO represented a way to avoid banning assassination.  The 
Order was “Ford-Administration-bound.” This effort was very deliberate.’117 
 
Conclusion: Ford, the ‘imperial presidency’ and assassination 
This article has provided the first in-depth account of the Ford Administration’s approach 
to the revelations regarding the US government’s involvement in the assassination of foreign 
leaders. It has looked at both the administration’s reaction to the Congressional inquiries and 
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at its effort to set the terms for future policies and debates on assassination. The article 
identifies three key steps: first, the creation and management of the Rockefeller Commission; 
second, the approach adopted towards the Church Committee and its investigation of 
assassination; third, the stark contrast between the language adopted by the Committee in its 
interim report and that of the ban included in the Executive Order decided upon by Ford. 
Through this analysis, the article has challenged prevailing interpretations of the Ford 
Administration and has made its main contribution.  
Contrary to existing literature, this article positions the Ford Administration at the centre 
of debates regarding the role of assassination in US foreign policy. It identifies the 
Administration’s key contribution to the development of US policy. In particular, the analysis 
has highlighted the ‘special status’ of assassination in debates and decisions within the 
executive. This is demonstrated by three main pieces of evidence. First, the Administration 
excluded assassination from the remit of the Rockefeller Commission and suppressed the 
section of the commission’s report dealing with the topic. Second, the White House proved 
particularly unwilling to cooperate with the Church Committee on assassination. Finally, both 
Ford and Kissinger showed clear concerns that assassination might become the object of 
Congressional legislative measures. Ford’s concerns and Kissinger’s outbursts, as well as the 
language of the assassination ban make clear that this was an area in which the Ford 
Administration had an interest in preserving presidential flexibility. The aim of the 
administration was to maintain the issue of assassination in a status of ‘strategic ambiguity.’ 
The article also challenges prevailing interpretations surrounding the Ford presidency. 
First, scholars of the ‘imperial presidency’ have generally ignored the Ford Administration, 
focusing, instead, on what could be defined as the ‘usual suspects’ when it comes to Imperial 
Presidents: Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush.118 There seems to be a consensus regarding 
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the place of the Ford Administration in the ebb and flow of Presidential power. Katherine 
Scott has argued that during the Ford Administration Congress and groups within the civil 
society had completed a process of ‘reining in’ the Executive.119 Similarly, Andrew 
Rudalevige positions the Ford Administration at the high point of what he calls the 
congressional ‘resurgence regime.’120 Rudalevige, in particular, has suggested that the 
presidency is ‘contingently’ imperial; that is, the power of the President expands when 
Congress is inactive or permits such expansion.121 Furthermore, as Rudalevige wrote, 
confronted by Congressional inquiries on the activities of the intelligence community, ‘Ford 
felt he had little choice but to provide Congress with virtually all it requested.’122 The account 
above has shown that, in the middle of the 1970s, when the power of Congress seemed 
formidable, the Ford Administration was still able to fend off Congressional offensives as 
well as to maintain and, to a certain extent, expand Presidential power and control. Looking 
back at the Ford Administration, Richard Cheney agreed with this assessment. As he recalled, 
during the Ford years nothing was ‘as perilous as the collapse of executive authority.’ Ford 
prevented such collapse.123 Furthermore, the Administration was largely in control of the 
confrontation with Congress and the Church Committee. The Committee was (almost) as 
managed as the Rockefeller Commission. As Frank Smist concluded, the Committee’s 
agenda was driven by the Executive decisions regarding the release of information and what 
information to release.124  
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Second, a review of the establishment and management of the Rockefeller Commission 
and of the early decisions taken by the Administration also suggests the need for a re-
interpretation of the Administration’s early approach to scandals and Congressional inquiries. 
Far from being unprepared, as Olmsted and Johnson suggested, the Administration was, from 
the start, in control of the process. Finally, in this process, the Administration was also helped 
by the CIA where, Director William Colby, far from adopting a supine attitude towards 
Congress, helped the White House in carefully managing and stymying Congressional 
inquiries. The CIA and the White House made sure that the option of assassination would not 
be completely cut-off by Congressional intervention. 
The article has reinterpreted the role and approach of the Ford Administration and it has 
identified the role of the Administration in setting the parameters for future US policy on 
assassination. Rather than Reagan’s ‘war on terror,’ the ban on assassination contained in 
Executive Order 11905, the rationale and the decision that led to that order, are the real 
starting point for any analysis of the evolution of US policy surrounding assassination. 
Having identified more clearly this starting point, this article suggests the need for future 
research to investigate the extent to which administrations after Ford’s as well as intelligence 
officials recognised and exploited the ambiguity of the executive order. Future research 
should not take debates in the 1980s at face value and should avoid tropes regarding a linear 
evolution of counter-terrorism policy. It should explore how each Administration confronted, 
debated and, at times, challenged the ban on assassination, as well as the motives behind 
these challenges. As several interviewees have suggested, the ambiguity of the ban in 
EO11905 has given each president and each White House an opportunity to interpret the ban 
in line with their strategic interests, as well as the power to suspend it at will.125 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 Doyle McManus, Interview with the author, 3 August 2016, Washington DC; Scott Shane, Skype interview 
with the author, 3 August 2016. 
